This article is roughly divided into two parts. The first part
shows how "liberals and the Left in the United States"
and the public generally view the notion of "war on terror"
- in other words, how the mainstream media has sold or foisted
the idea to the public. Readers might want to go directly to the
section "What War On Terror?" (click
here), which tries to answer the question, what does "war
on terror" mean, before backtracking to the preamble. No
surprise that a main purveyor of "terror" - creating
fear and apathy - is none other than the Cheney-Bush administration.
of the most telling signs of the political naiveté of liberals
and the Left in the United States has been their steadfast faith
in much of the worldview that blankets the imperial state they
call home. Nowhere has this critical failure been more evident
than in their acceptance of the premise that there really is something
called a "war on terror" or "terrorism" -however
poorly managed its critics make it out to be - and that righting
the course of this war ought to be this country's (and the worlds)
top foreign policy priority.
In this perspective, Afghanistan and Pakistan rather than Iraq
ought to have been the war on terror's proper foci; most accept
that the U.S. attack on Afghanistan from October 2001 on was a
legitimate and necessary stage in the war. The tragic error of
the Bush Administration, in this view, was that it lost sight
of this priority, and diverted U.S. military action to Iraq and
other theaters, reducing the commitment where it was needed.
we expect to find this line of criticism expressed by the many
former supporters who have fled from the sinking regime in Washington.
But it is striking that commentators as durably hostile to Bush
policies as the New York Times's Frank Rich should accept so many
of the fundamentals of this worldview, and repeat them without
Rich asserts that the question "Who lost Iraq? is but a distraction
from the more damning question, Who is losing the war on terrorism?"
A repeated theme of Rich's work has been that the Cheney-Bush
presidency is causing "as much damage to fighting the war on terrorism
as it does to civil liberties." Even in late 2007, Rich still
lamented the "really bad news" that, "Much as Iraq distracted
America from the war against Al Qaeda, so a strike on Iran could
ignite Pakistan, Al Qaeda's thriving base and the actual central
front of the war on terror."
of faith in something called the "war on terror" abound. Thus
in a long review of several books in which she urged "[r]evamping
our approach to terrorism" and "recapturing hearts and minds"
around the world, Harvard's Samantha Power, a top lieutenant in
the humanitarian brigade, wrote that "most Americans still rightly
believe that the United States must confront Islamic terrorism
- and must be relentless in preventing terrorist networks from
getting weapons of mass destruction. But Bush's premises have
Most striking was Power's expression of disappointment that "millions
- if not billions - of people around the world do not see the
difference between a suicide bomber's attack on a pizzeria and
an American attack on what turns out to be a wedding party" -
the broken moral compass residing within these masses, of course,
who fail to understand that only the American attacks are legitimate
and that the numerous resultant casualties are but "tragic
errors" and "collateral damage."
Power, the What We're Fighting For statement issued in February
2002 by the Institute for American Values and signed by 60 U.S.
intellectuals, including Jean Bethke Elshtain, Francis Fukuyama,
Mary Ann Glendon, Samuel Huntington, Harvey C. Mansfield, Will
Marshall, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Michael Novak, Michael Walzer,
George Weigel, and James Q. Wilson, declared the war on terror
a "just war."
"Organized killers with global reach now threaten all of us,"
it is asserted in one revealing passage. "In the name of universal
human morality, and fully conscious of the restrictions and requirements
of a just war, we support our government's, and our society's,
decision to use force of arms against them."
The idea that "killers with global reach" who are far more deadly
and effective than Al Qaeda could be found at home doesnt
seem to occur to these intellectuals. And like Power, they also
make what they believe a telling distinction between the deliberate
killing of civilians, as in a suicide bombing, and "collateral
damage"-type casualties even in cases where civilian casualties
are vastly larger and entirely predictable, though not specifically
Throughout these reflections, the purpose is to distinguish our
murderous acts from theirs. It is the latter that constitute a
"world-threatening evil... that clearly requires the use of force
to remove it."
In the same
mode, Princeton University international law professor Richard
Falk's early contributions to The Nation after 9/11 found a "visionary
program of international, apocalyptic terrorism" behind the events.
"It is truly a declaration of war from the lower depths," Falk
wrote, a "transformative shift in the nature of the terrorist
challenge both conceptually and tactically... There is no indication
that the forces behind the attack were acting on any basis beyond
their extraordinary destructive intent... We are poised on the
brink of a global, intercivilizational war without battlefields
the organizers and their supporters in the "war on terror,"
raising the question of "why" is regarded as a
form of apologetics for terror, and they are uninterested
in the question.
later, in a nod to "just war" doctrine, Falk argued that the "destruction
of both the Taliban regime and the Al Qaeda network... are appropriate
goals... [T]he case [against the Taliban] is strengthened," he
added, "to the degree that its governing policies are so oppressive
as to give the international community the strongest possible
grounds for humanitarian intervention."
a liberal-leaning former editor of the New Republic and the author
of the 2006 book, The Good Fight: Why Liberals - And Only Liberals
- Can Win the War On Terror And Make America Great Again, wrote
in the aftermath of Cheney-Bush's 2004 re-election: "Today, the
war on terrorism is partially obscured by the war in Iraq, which
has made liberals cynical about the purposes of U.S. power. But,
even if Iraq is Vietnam, it no more obviates the war on terrorism
than Vietnam obviated the battle against communism. Global jihad
will be with us long after American troops stop dying in Falluja
and Mosul. And thus, liberalism will rise or fall on whether it
can become, again, what [Arthur] Schlesinger called 'a fighting
Cole and Jules Lobel, authors of a highly-regarded critique of
Cheney-Bush policies on "Why America Is Losing the War on
Terror," take the existence of its "counterterrorism strategy"
at face value; this strategy has been a "colossal failure," they
argue, because it has "compromised our spirit, strengthened our
enemies and left us less free and less safe."
The U.S. war in Iraq "permitted the Administration to turn its
focus from Al Qaeda, the organization that attacked us on 9/11,
to Iraq, a nation that did not. The Iraq war has by virtually
all accounts made the United States, the Iraqi people, many of
our allies and, for that matter, much of the world more vulnerable
By targeting Iraq, the Bush Administration not only siphoned off
much-needed resources from the struggle against Al Qaeda but also
created a golden opportunity for Al Qaeda to inspire and recruit
others to attack US and allied targets. And our invasion of Iraq
has turned it into the world's premier terrorist training ground."
appearing at a forum in New York City sponsored by the Open Society
Institute to discuss his work, David Cole made the remarkable
assertion that "no one argued" the post-9/11 U.S. attack on Afghanistan
was "not a legitimate act of self-defense." No less
remarkable was Cole's statement shortly thereafter that the United
States' "holding [of prisoners] at Guantanamo would not have been
controversial practice had we given them hearings at the outset,"
because, as Cole explained it, such hearings "would have identified
those people as to whom we had no evidence that they were involved
with Al Qaeda and then they would be released."
remark ignores the UN Charter, which allows an attack on another
state in self-defense only when an imminent attack is threatened,
and then only until such time as the Security Council acts on
behalf of the threatened state. But given the absence of such
urgency and the absence of a UN authorization, and given that
the hijacker bombers of 9/11 were independent terrorists and not
agents of a state, the October 2001 U.S. war on Afghanistan was
a violation of the UN Charter and a "supreme international
crime," in the language of the Judgment at Nuremberg.
Would Cole have defended Cuban or Nicaraguan or Iraqi bombing
attacks on Washington D.C. as legitimate acts of self-defense
at any juncture in the past when the United States was attacking
or sponsoring an attack on these countries? We doubt it. Cole
also seems unaware that the United States attacked after refusing
the Afghan governments offer to give up bin Laden upon the
presentation of evidence of his involvement in the crime.
Furthermore, the war began long after bin Laden and his forces
had been given time to exit, and was fought mainly against the
Taliban government and Afghan people, thousands of whom were killed
under targeting rules that assured and resulted in numerous "tragic
errors" and can reasonably be called war crimes.
illegality and immorality of this war - now already well into
its seventh year - the killing of people in Afghanistan cannot
be regarded as "legitimate" - and neither can the taking
of prisoners there under any conditions.
Cole's second remark also ignores the modes of seizure of prisoners,
some turned over in exchange for cash bounties; or their treatment
in Afghanistan, en route to Guantanamo, and in rendition facilities,
apart from delays in or absence of "hearings at the outset."
Last, Cole is wrong even on the alleged general agreement on the
legitimacy of this act of "self-defense" in Afghanistan.
Despite the domestic hysteria in the United States at the time,
a number of lawyers here contested its legitimacy. Furthermore,
a series of opinion polls in 37 different countries by Gallup
International in late September 2001 found that in no less than
34 of these countries, majorities opposed a U.S. military attack
on Afghanistan, preferring instead to see the events of September
11 treated as crimes (i.e., non-militarily), with extradition
and trial for the alleged culprits.
The three countries where opinion ran against the majority in
the other 34 were the United States (54 per cent), India (72 per
cent), and Israel (77 per cent). Otherwise, it appears that significant
and sometimes overwhelming majorities of the world's population
were opposed to the U.S. resort to war.
war on terror is an intellectual and propaganda cover, analogous
- and in many ways a successor - to the departed "Cold
War," which in its time also served as a cover for
+ + + + +
War On Terror?
of the "failure" of the war on terror rests on the false premise
that there really is such a war. This we reject on a number of
grounds. First, in all serious definitions of the term, terror
is a means of pursuing political ends, an instrument of struggle,
and it makes little sense to talk about war against a means and
Furthermore, if the means consists of modes of political intimidation
and publicity-seeking that use or threaten force against civilians,
a major problem with the alleged "war" is that the United
States and Israel also clearly use terror and support allies and
agents who do the same.
The "shock and awe" strategy that opened the 2003 invasion-occupation
of Iraq was openly and explicitly designed to terrorize the Iraq
population and armed forces. Much of the bombing and torture,
and the attack that destroyed Falluja, have been designed to instill
fear and intimidate the general population and resistance.
Israels repeated bombing attacks, ground assaults, and targeted
assassinations of Palestinians are also designed to create fear
and apathy, that is, terrorize. As longtime Labour Party official
Abba Eban admitted years ago, Israels bombing of Lebanon
civilians was based on "the rational prospect, ultimately
fulfilled, that afflicted populations [i.e., civilians deliberately
targeted] would exert pressure for the cessation of hostilities."
This was a precise admission of the use of terrorism, and surely
fits Israeli policy in the years of the alleged "war on terror."
Former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has also acknowledged an intent
to attack civilians, declaring in March 2002 that "The Palestinians
must be hit and it must be very painful: we must cause them losses,
victims, so that they feel the heavy price."
States and Israel actually engage in big-time terror, like strategic
bombing, helicopter attacks, torture on a continuing basis, and
large-scale invasions and invasion threats, not lower-casualty-inflicting
actions like occasional plane hijackings and suicide bombings.
This has long been characterized as the difference between wholesale
and retail terror, the former carried out by states and on a large
scale, the latter implemented by individuals and small groups,
much smaller in scale, and causing fewer civilian victims than
its wholesale counterpart.
Retail terrorists dont maintain multiple detention centers
in which they employ torture (at the height of its state terror
activities in the 1970s the Argentinian military maintained an
estimated 60 such centers, according to Amnesty International;
the United States today, on land bases and naval vessels and in
client state operated facilities, uses dozens of such centers).
retail terror is often sponsored by the wholesale terrorists -
notoriously, the Cuban refugee network operating out of the United
States for decades, the U.S.-supported Nicaraguan contras, Savimbis
UNITA in Angola in the 1980s, backed by both South Africa and
the United States, the South Lebanon Army supported by Israel
for years, and the Colombian rightwing death squads still in operation,
with U.S. support. Thus, a meaningful war on terror would surely
involve attacks on the United States and Israel as premier wholesale
terrorists and sponsors, a notion we have yet to find expounded
by a single one of the current war-on-terror proponents.
one secret of the widespread belief that the United States and
Israel are fighting - not carrying out - terror is the remarkable
capacity of the Western media and intellectual class to ignore
the standard definitions of terror and the reality of who does
the most terrorizing, and thus to allow the Western political
establishments to use the invidious word to apply to their targets.
We only retaliate and engage in "counter-terror" - our
targets started it and their lesser violence is terrorism.
and closely related secret of the swallowing of war-on-terror
propaganda is the ability of the swallowers to ignore the U.S.
purposes and program. They never ask: Is the United States simply
responding to the 9/11 attack or do its leaders have a larger
agenda for which they can use 9/11 terrorism as a cover?
But this obvious question almost answers itself: Documents of
the prior decade show clearly that the Bush team was openly hoping
for another "Pearl Harbor" that would allow them to go on the
offensive and project power in the Middle East and across the
globe. In the rightfully infamous words of the Project for the
New American Century (2000), "the process of transformation, even
if it brings revolutionary change, is likely to be a long one,
absent some catastrophic and catalyzing event - like a new Pearl
The huge military forces that have been built up in this country
conveniently permit this power-projection by threat and use of
force, and their buildup and use has had bipartisan support, reflecting
in large measure the power and objectives of the military establishment,
military contractors, and transnational corporations. The military
buildup was not for defensive purposes in any meaningful sense;
it was for power-projection, which is to say, for offense.
Jordan, Morocco, Algeria, and other torture-prone states
are "with us" in the war on terror; states like
Venezuela, Iran and Cuba are not with us and are easily
situated as terrorist or "linked" to terrorist
In this connection
we should point out that at the time of 9/11 in the year 2001,
Al Qaeda was considered by most experts to be a small non-state
operation, possibly centered in Afghanistan and/or Pakistan, but
loosely sprawled across the globe, and with at most only a few
It is clear that such a small and diffuse operation called for
an anti-crime and intelligence response, not a war. Of course
a war could be carried out against the country which was their
principal home, but given the lags involved and the threat that
a war, with its civilian casualties and imperialist overtones,
would possibly strengthen Al Qaeda, the quick resort to war in
the post-9/11 period suggests covert motives, including vengeance
and taking advantage of 9/11 for power-projection.
And while a war could be launched against Afghanistan and an attack
made on Al Qaeda headquarters, this was hardly a war on terror.
Nor could the huge military buildup that ensued have been based
on a fight in Afghanistan or against tiny Al Qaeda.
It is also
notable that there has been no attempt by the organizers of the
war on terror to try to stop terrorism at its source by addressing
the problems that have produced the terrorists and provided their
recruiting base. In fact, for the organizers and their supporters
in the "war on terror," raising the question of "why"
is regarded as a form of apologetics for terror, and they are
uninterested in the question, satisfied with clichés about
the terrorists' envy, hatred of freedom, and genetic or religious
This is consistent with the view that getting rid of terror is
not their aim, and that in fact they need the steady flow of resisters-terrorists
which their actions produce to justify their real purpose of power
projection virtually without limit. Failure to end terrorism is
not a failure of the "war on terror," it is a necessary
part of its machinery of operation.
the war on terror is an intellectual and propaganda cover, analogous
- and in many ways a successor - to the departed "Cold War,"
which in its time also served as a cover for imperial expansion.
Guatemala, Vietnam, Chile, Indonesia, Zaire (and many others)
were regularly subverted or attacked on the ground of an alleged
Soviet menace that had to be combated. That menace was rarely
applicable to the actual cases, and the strained connection was
With that cover gone, pursuing terrorists is proving to be an
admirable substitute, as once again a gullible media will accept
that any targeted rebels are actual or potential terrorists and
may even have links to Al Qaeda. The FARC rebels in Colombia are
terrorists, but the government-supported rightwing paramilitaries
who kill many more civilians than FARC are not and are the beneficiaries
of U.S. "counter-terrorism" aid.
Hugo Chavezs Venezuela, on the other hand, which does not
kill civilians, is accused of lack of cooperation in the U.S.
"counter-terrorism" program, and is alleged to have
"links" to U.S. targets such as Iran and Cuba, which
allegedly support terrorists. Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Algeria,
and other torture-prone states are "with us" in the
war on terror; states like Venezuela, Iran and Cuba are not with
us and are easily situated as terrorist or "linked"
to terrorist states.
If Al Qaeda
didnt exist, the United States would have had to create
it and, of course, it did create it back in the 1980s, as a means
of destabilizing the Soviet Union. Al Qaedas more recent
role is a classic case of "blowback." It is also a case
of resistance to power-projection, as Al Qaeda's terrorist activities
switched from combating a Soviet occupation, to combating U.S.
intervention in Saudi Arabia, Palestine and elsewhere. It was
also spurred by lagged resentment at being used by the United
States for its Soviet destabilization purposes and then abandoned.
interventionism gave Al Qaeda a strong start, and while it continues
today to facilitate Al Qaeda recruitment, it has also provoked
resistance far beyond Al Qaeda, as in Iraq, where most of the
resistance has nothing to do with Al Qaeda and in fact has widely
turned against it.
If as the United States projects power across the globe this produces
resistance, and if this resistance can be labeled "terrorists,"
then U.S. aggression and wholesale terror are home-free! Any country
that is willing to align with the United States can get its dissidents
and resistance condemned as "terrorists," with or without links
to Al Qaeda, and get U.S. military aid. The war on terror is a
war of superpower power-projection, which is to say, an imperialist
war on a global scale.
of who terrorizes whom is hardly new. Back in 1979, Noam Chomsky
and Edward Herman's The Washington Connection and Third World
Fascism featured the U.S. terror gulag in great detail, and even
had a frontispiece showing the flow of economic and military aid
from the United States to 26 of the 35 countries using torture
on an administrative basis in that era.
Herman's The Real Terror Network of 1982 also traced out a U.S.-sponsored
terror gulag and showed its logical connection to the growth of
the transnational corporation and desire for friendly state-terrorists
who would produce favorable climates of investment (recall Philippine
dictator Ferdinand Marcos's statement to U.S. oil companies back
at the time of his 1972 accession to power: "Well pass
laws you need - just tell us what you want.").
country that is willing to align with the United States
can get its dissidents and resistance condemned as "terrorists,"
with or without links to Al Qaeda, and get U.S. military
aid. The war on terror is a war of superpower power-projection,
which is to say, an imperialist war on a global scale.
works were ignored in the mainstream and could hardly compete
with Claire Sterling's The Terror Network, which traced selected
retail terrorisms - falsely - to the Soviet Union. This fit the
Reagan-era "war on terror" claims, which coincided with
the Reagan era support of Israel's attack on Lebanon and subsequent
"iron fist" terrorism there, Reagan's support of the
Argentine military regime, Suharto, Marcos, South Africa, the
Guatemalan and Salvadoran terror regimes, Savimbi, the Cuban terror
network, and the Nicaraguan contras.
record of U.S. terrorism and support of terrorism occasionally
surfaces in the mainstream, but is brushed aside on the ground
that the United States has taken a new course, so that long record
can be ignored. In a classic of this genre, Michael Ignatieff,
writing in the New York Times Magazine, claimed that this was
so because President George Bush said so!
"The democratic turn in American foreign policy has been recent,"
he wrote, adding that at long last, the current George Bush has
"actually risked his presidency on the premise that Jefferson
might be right."
This capacity to ignore history, and the institutional underpinning
of that history, complements the mainstream media and intellectuals'
ability to take as a premise that the United States is virtuous
and in its foreign dealings is trying to do good or is just defending
itself against bad people and movements who for no good reason
hate us. As noted, the amazing definitional systems in use are
de facto Alice-in-Wonderland: Terrorism is anything I choose to
target and so designate.
of the Bush era projection of power and wholesale terrorism are
their brazenness and scope. Past U.S. employment of torture, and
of gulags in which to hold and work-over alleged or possible terrorists
or resisters, were more or less sub rosa, the cruelties and violations
of international law and U.S. involvement kept more or less plausibly
The Bush team is open about them, calling for legalization of
torture and their other violations of international law, which
they rationalize by heavy-handed redefinitions of "torture"
and claims of the inapplicability of international law to their
new category of "enemy combatants."
Bush also brags in public about the extension of the U.S. killing
machine to distant places and the extent to which declared enemies
have been removed, implicitly by killing, obviously without hearing
or trial. On September 17, 2001, Bush signed a "classified Presidential
Finding that authorized an unprecedented range of covert operations,"
the Washington Post later reported, including "lethal measures
against terrorists and the expenditure of vast funds to coax foreign
intelligence services into a new era of cooperation with the CIA."
And in his State of the Union speech of 2003, Bush asserted that
"more than 3,000 suspected terrorists" had been arrested
across the globe "and many others have met a different fate
- Lets put it this way: They are no longer a problem to
the United States and our friends and allies." As Chris
Floyd has pointed out, this represents the work of a "universal
death squad," the authorization and accomplishments of
which were barely acknowledged in the mainstream media.
has also been broadened in scope and is a facet of globalization.
In accord with the principles of globalization, there has been
a major increase in the privatization of terrorism. Blackwater
Worldwide is only the best known of mercenary armies in Iraq that
now outnumber regular armed force members, and who are free from
some of the legal constraints of the armed forces in how they
treat the local population.
The global American gulag of secret prisons and torture centers
to which an unknown number of people have been sent, held without
trial, worked over and sometimes killed as well as tortured, is
located in many countries: The "spider's web" first described
by a Council of Europe investigation identified landings and takeoffs
at no fewer than 30 airports on four different continents;
and earlier research by Human Rights First estimated that the
United States was operating dozens of major and lesser known detention
centers as part of its "war on terror": These included the obvious
cases of Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib and other prisons in Iraq, the
U.S. Air Force base at Bagram in Afghanistan, Camp Bondsteel in
Kosovo, and other suspected centers in Pakistan, Jordan, Diego
Garcia in the Indian Ocean, and on U.S. Navy ships at sea.
Still others are operated by client and other states at the torture-producing
end of the "extraordinary rendition" chain (Egypt, Syria,
Jordan, Morocco). Given the vastness of this U.S. enterprise,
surely we are talking about tens-of-thousands of prisoners, a
great many picked-up and tortured based on rumor, the inducement
of bonus payments, denunciations in vendettas, and accidents of
name or location.
We know that a great majority of those imprisoned in sweeps in
Iraq were taken without the slightest information on wrong-doing
even on aggressor-occupier terms. There is strong anecdotal
evidence that suggests that the same is true in Afghanistan.
United States and Israel] are clearly the global leaders
in state-terrorism that many observers believe to be the
main force inspiring a global resistance and spurring on
various forms of Islamic terrorism, including Al Qaeda.
But instead of focusing on the causal wars and state-terrorism...
the UN and international community have focused on the lesser
and derivative terrorism, and taken the "war on terror"
at face value. In other words, they have once again assumed
the role of servants of U.S. policy.
notable feature of the "war on terror" is the extent
to which this mythical war has been advanced via the UN and the
"international community," the UNs work in particular serving
as an extension of U.S. policy. This has been in marked contrast
to their treatment of open aggression and violations of the UN
Charter's prohibition of aggressive war.
Time and again the United States and Israel have violated this
fundamental international law during the past decade, and they
are clearly the global leaders in state-terrorism that many observers
believe to be the main force inspiring a global resistance and
spurring on various forms of Islamic terrorism, including Al Qaeda.
But instead of focusing on the causal wars and state-terrorism,
following the U.S. lead the UN and international community have
focused on the lesser and derivative terrorism, and taken the
"war on terror" at face value.
In other words, they have once again assumed the role of servants
of U.S. policy, in this instance helping the aggressor states
and wholesale terrorists struggle against the retail terror they
We can trace
this pattern at least as far back as October 1999 (almost two
years before 9/11), when the Security Council adopted Resolution
1267 "on the situation in Afghanistan." This Resolution deplored
that the "Taliban continues to provide safe haven to Usama bin
Laden," and it demanded that the "Taliban turn over Usama bin
Laden without further delay to appropriate authorities in a country
where he has been indicted." 1267 also created the Al-Qaeda and
Taliban Sanctions Committee to manage this effort to squeeze the
Taliban and anyone linkable to either of them.
At the time, bin Laden had been indicted by a U.S. Federal Court
for his alleged involvement in the August 1998 suicide bombings
at the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing some 250
people; Al Qaeda had also been designated a terrorist organization
by the U.S. Department of State.
"The international community has sent a clear message," President
Bill Clinton announced. "The choice between co-operation and isolation
lies with the Taliban." But the Taliban complained that "This
unfair action was taken under the pressure of the United States...
So far, there has not been any evidence of Osama's involvement
in terrorism by any one" - essentially the same retort that the
Taliban made to Bush White House demands after 9/11 that the Taliban
surrender bin Laden. 1267 thus extended key components of
the 1996 U.S. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act's
category of states designated "not cooperating with U.S. anti-terrorism
efforts" beyond U.S. borders to the level of internationally-enforceable
days after 1267, the Council adopted companion Resolution 1269
"on the responsibility of the Security Council in the maintenance
of international peace and security." 1269 condemned the "practices
of terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable, regardless of their
motivation," and stressed the "vital role" of the UN "in combating
Similarly, Resolution 1373, adopted shortly after the 9/11 attacks
and just days before the United States launched its war to remove
the Taliban, greatly expanded the UN's involvement in the U.S.
"war on terror," creating the Counter-Terrorism Committee to manage
the fight against terrorism and criminalizing all forms of support
for individuals and groups engaged in terrorism. Like 1267 and,
later, 1540 (April 24, 2004), which created a committee to prevent
"non-State actors" from acquiring "weapons of mass destruction,"
the Security Council adopted each of these resolutions under Chapter
VII of the UN Charter, on the basis of which the Council is to
supposed to respond to "threats to the peace, breaches of the
peace, and acts of aggression."
All of this
vigilance with respect to "terrorism," and the notion that "non-State
actors" and "terrorists" of the Al Qaeda variety deserve this
intense UN concern, stands in dramatic contrast with the treatment
of literal aggression, as in Afghanistan and Iraq, and genocidal
actions such as the U.S.-U.K.-UN "sanctions of mass destruction"
that killed possibly a million Iraqi civilians during the years
between the first and second wars against Iraq, ca. 1991-2003.
Yet, in his report In larger freedom (March, 2005), Kofi Annan
argued that "It is time to set aside debates on so-called 'State
terrorism'. The use of force by States is already thoroughly regulated
under international law. And the right to resist occupation must
be understood in its true meaning. It cannot include the right
to deliberately kill or maim civilians."
comments contain a major falsehood and reflect serious pro-state-terrorism
and anti-resistance bias - there is no "thorough" regulation of
state-terrorism, and in fact there is none at all, as evidenced
by the fact that the United States and its allies have been able
to attack three countries in a single decade (the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and Iraq) without the slightest impediment
from Kofi Annan's United Nations, but also in each case with
the UN's ex post facto assent.
U.S. military actions abroad since 9/11 have had little
or no connection with Al Qaeda; and you cannot war on a
method of struggle, especially when you, your allies and
clients use those methods as well.
Annan's failure to suggest that states should not have the "right
to deliberately kill or maim civilians," a concern that he exhibits
only as regards resisters to state violence and occupation. This
despite the fact that in their recent and ongoing wars the United
States and its allies have killed, maimed, starved, and driven
from their homes vastly more civilians than has Al Qaeda or all
of the world's retail terrorists combined.
Note also that within the targeted countries, political leaders
have been captured by these aggressors, and subjected to trial
by tribunals - but never the leadership of the great powers. In
pursuing their enemies to the farthest reaches of the earth, they
continue to enjoy complete impunity.
In sum, the
war on terror is a political gambit and myth used to cover over
a U.S. projection of power that needed rhetorical help with the
disappearance of the Soviet Union and Cold War. It has been successful
because U.S. leaders could hide behind the very real 9/11 terrorist
attack and pretend that their own wars, wholesale terrorist actions,
and enlarged support of a string of countries - many authoritarian
and engaged in state terrorism - were somehow linked to that attack
and its Al Qaeda authors.
But most U.S. military actions abroad since 9/11 have had little
or no connection with Al Qaeda; and you cannot war on a method
of struggle, especially when you, your allies and clients use
those methods as well.
It is widely
argued now that the war on terror has been a failure. This also
is a fallacy, resting on the imputation of purpose to the wars
organizers contrary to their actual aims - they were looking for
and found the new "Pearl Harbor" needed to justify a
surge of U.S. force projection across the globe.
It appears that Al Qaeda is stronger now than it was on September
11, 2001; but Al Qaeda was never the main target of the Bush administration.
If Al Qaeda had been, the Bush administration would have tried
much more seriously to apprehend bin Laden, by military or political
action, and it would not have carried out policies in Iraq, Palestine,
Pakistan, Iran and elsewhere that have played so well into bin
Ladens hand - arguably, policy responses that bin Laden
hoped to provoke.
If Washington really had been worried at the post-9/11 terrorist
threat it would have followed through on the 9/11 Commissions
recommendations for guarding U.S. territory (ports, chemical plants,
nuclear facilities, airports and other transportation hubs, and
the like). The fact that it hasnt done this, but instead
has adopted a cynical and politicized system of terrorism alerts,
is testimony to the administration's own private understanding
of the contrived character of the war on terror and the alleged
threats that we face.
the surge in power projection that 9/11 and the war on terror
facilitated has not been a complete and unadulterated success.
But the "war on terror" gambit did enable this surge
to come about, and it should be recognized that the invasion-occupation
of Iraq was not a diversion, its conquest was one of the intended
objectives of this war.
That conquest may be in jeopardy, but looked at from the standpoint
of its organizers, the war has achieved some of the real goals
for which it was designed; and in this critical but seldom appreciated
sense it has been a success. It has facilitated two U.S. military
invasions of foreign countries, served to line-up many other states
behind the leader of the war, helped once again to push NATO into
new, out-of-area operations, permitted a further advance in the
U.S. disregard of international law, helped bring about quasi-regime
changes in some major European capitals, and was the basis for
the huge growth in U.S. and foreign military budgets.
While its destabilization of the Middle East has possibly benefited
Iran, it has given Israel a free hand in accelerated ethnic cleansing,
settlements, and more ruthless treatment of the Palestinians,
and the United States and Israel still continue to threaten and
with the cooperation of the Democrats and mass media, the "war
on terror" gave the "decider" and his clique the
political ability to impose an unconstitutional, rightwing agenda
at home, at the expense of the rule of law, economic equality,
environmental and other regulation, and social solidarity.
The increased military budget and militarization of U.S. society,
the explosive growth in corporate "counter-terrorism" and "homeland
security" enterprises, the greater centralization of power in
the executive branch, the enhanced inequality, the unimpeded growth
of the prison-industrial complex, the more rightwing judiciary,
and the failure of the Democrats to do anything to counter these
trends since the 2006 election, suggests that the shift to the
right and to a more militarized society and expansionist foreign
policy may have become permanent features of life in the United
States. Is that not a war on terror success story, given the aims
of its creators?
 We will
use the phrases 'war on terror' and 'war on terrorism' interchangeably.
Nor are we aware of any nuance in meaning to be gained by distinguishing
one phrase from the other. This caveat also holds for the similar
phrase 'global war on terror'. (Etc.)
e.g., Francis Fukuyama, America at the Crossroads: Democracy,
Power and the Neoconservative Legacy (Yale University Press, 2006).
Along with 24 others that included Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld,
Paul Wolfowitz, Zalmay Khalilzad, Lewis Libby, Paula Dobriansky,
and Norman Podhoretz, Fukuyama was a founding member of the Project
for the New American Century, whose efforts to "rally support
for the cause of American global leadership" and a "Reaganite
policy of military strength and moral clarity" the world continues
to suffer beneath. See the Project's "Statement of Principles,"
June 3, 1997.
Rich, "Where Were You That Summer of 2001?" New York Times, February
25, 2007; "The Wiretappers That Couldn't Shoot Straight," January
8, 2006; and "Noun + Verb + 9/11 + Iran = Democrats' Defeat?"
New York Times, November 4, 2007.
Power, "Our War on Terror," New York Times Book Review, July 29,
2007. Power also used this review to lavish praise on the recently
updated The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual
(University of Chicago Press, 2007), assembled by U.S. Army General
David Petraeus et al., the current commander of the U.S.-led Multinational
Force in occupied Iraq, along with critical input from members
of the humanitarian brigades, including Sarah Sewall, a colleague
of Power's at Harvard's Carr Center for Human Rights Policy.
that Samantha Power implies that an "American [bombing] attack
on what turns out to be a wedding party" is a unique and excusable
"error." This is false. It was not even the only wedding party
bombed in Iraq and Afghanistan by U.S. forces, and the notable
feature of both U.S. wars in these countries is the lavish use
of devastatingly powerful explosives in places where civilian
casualties are certain. In Afghanistan, the United States has
bombed every kind of civilian infrastructure - dams, telephone
exchanges, schools, power stations, bridges, trucks on roads,
mosques, Al Jazeera radio, and even the well-marked Red Cross
facilities in Kabul. It has also used cluster bombs on a massive
scale. In his exhaustive analysis of civilian casualties, Marc
W. Herold states that the 3,000-3,400 civilian deaths resulting
from U.S. bombing in the period October 7, 2001 - March 2002 can
be explained best by "the low value put upon Afghan civilian
lives by U.S. military planners and the political elite, as clearly
revealed by their willingness to bomb heavily populated areas."
He concludes that "the U.S. bombing campaign which began
on the evening of October 7th, has been a war upon the people,
the homes, the farms and the villages of Afghanistan, as well
as upon the Taliban and Al Qaeda." (Marc W. Herold, "A Dossier
on Civilian Victims of United States' Aerial Bombing of Afghanistan,"
Revised Edition, March 2002.) This bombing war relied heavily
on people like Samantha Power and the media to keep the ruthlessly
anti-civilian character of this war out of public sight. (Also
see Tom Engelhardt, "'Accidents' of War: The Time Has Come for
an Honest Discussion of Air Power," TomDispatch, July 9, 2007.)
We're Fighting For: A Letter from America, Institute for American
Values, February, 2002. This document is also reproduced in David
Blankenhorn et al., The Islam/West Debate: Documents from a Global
Debate on Terrorism, U.S. Policy, and the Middle East (Rowman
& Littlefield, 2005), pp. 21-40.
 For a
critique of this notion of civilian deaths as "collateral damage,"
a legal ploy by which Americans distinguish the "unintended" deaths
caused by their "far more terrifying violence" from the "premeditated"
deaths caused by enemies, see Michael Mandel, How America Gets
Away With Murder: Illegal Wars, Collateral Damage and Crimes Against
Humanity (Pluto Press, 2004), pp. 46-56.
 In their
discussion "A Just War?" the Institute for American Values asserted:
"Although in some circumstances, and within strict limits, it
can be morally justifiable to undertake military actions that
may result in the unintended but foreseeable death or injury of
some noncombatants, it is not morally acceptable to make the killing
of noncombatants the operational objective of a military action."
They continued: "On September 11, 2001, a group of individuals
deliberately attacked the United States... Those who died on the
morning of September 11 were killed unlawfully, wantonly, and
with premeditated malice - a kind of killing that, in the name
of precision, can only be described as murder... Those who slaughtered
more than 3,000 persons on September 11 and who, by their own
admission, want nothing more than to do it again, constitute a
clear and present danger to all people of good will everywhere
in the world, not just the United States. Such acts are a pure
example of naked aggression against innocent human life, a world-threatening
evil that clearly requires the use of force to remove it." (What
We're Fighting For: A Letter from America, Institute for American
Values, February, 2002.)
Falk, "A Just Response," The Nation, October 8, 2001; and "Defining
a Just War," The Nation, October 29, 2001. To his credit, Falk
was under no illusions that the Cheney-Bush regime would heed
any limits on the use of force.
Beinart, "A Fighting Faith," New Republic, December 13, 2004 (as
posted to the Free Republic website). Also see his The Good Fight:
Why Liberals - And Only Liberals - Can Win The War On Terror And
Make America Great Again (HarperCollins, 2006).
Cole and Jules Lobel, "Why We're Losing the War on Terror," The
Nation, September 24, 2007. Also see their Less Safe, Less Free:
Why America Is Losing the War on Terror (The New Press, 2007),
esp. Ch. 5, "The Costs of Overreaching," pp. 129-146.
Forum - Less Safe, Less Free," Open Society Institute, November
14, 2007. David Cole's own words were: "I just don't see anybody
around the world who has questioned the notion that the United
States has the right to respond to the attacks that we suffered
[on September 11, 2001] by going to Afghanistan. There are people
who say it wasn't the best policy. But no one argued it was not
a legitimate act of self-defense." And: "If you have the right
to go to war - you have the right to kill the people you're fighting
against - surely you have the right to hold them for the duration
of that conflict. So that's not a controversial issue. And holding
them at Guantanamo would not have been controversial practice
had we given them hearings at the outset. Which, for one, would
have identified those people as to whom we had no evidence that
they were involved with Al Qaeda and then they would be releasedand
then we wouldn't have the problem of innocent people being held
at Guantanamo." (Our transcription picks-up Cole's remarks beginning
at approximately the 49:35 minute mark of the full-length audio
charges in the Indictment that the defendants planned and waged
aggressive wars are charges of the utmost gravity. War is essentially
an evil thing. Its consequences are not confined to the belligerent
states alone, but affect the whole world. To initiate a war of
aggression, therefore, is not only an international crime; it
is the supreme international crime differing only from other war
crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil
of the whole." See Final Judgment of the International Military
Tribunal for the Trial of German Major War Criminals (September
30, 1946), specifically "The Common Plan or Conspiracy and Aggressive
War," from which this passage derives.
to Radio Voice of Shari'ah in Mazar-e Sharif, the capital of Balkh
province in northern Afghanistan, "senior officials" of the Taliban
released a statement as early as September 13, 2001 in which they
"honestly asked America to give clear and substantial evidence
for what it considers Usamah to be responsible for, and the [Taliban]
will hand him over to one of the Islamic courts of the world in
order to be tried. The stance of the [Taliban] is clear in this
regard. Otherwise, nobody can accuse others by bringing false
and groundless allegations." In the same statement, the Taliban
"condemn" the events of 9/11, calling them "against the welfare
and interests of the world." The Taliban also "expresses its sympathy
for the American people," adding that it "expects the USA not
to resort to irreparable measures before discovering the facts."
("Afghan Taleban ready to hand Bin-Ladin to Islamic court if USA
provides evidence - radio," BBC Monitoring Central Asia, September
13, 2001.) News of this and subsequent offers communicated by
Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil, the Taliban's foreign minister, and by
Abdul Salam Zaeef, the Taliban's ambassador to Pakistan, were
reported by Reuters, The Herald (Glasgow), the New York Times,
the Washington Post, the International Herald Tribune, the Boston
Globe, and The Independent (London). But as the record makes clear,
no one will ever know how genuine these offers really were - the
Bush White House categorically rejected them, and the offers died
the professors of law at U.S. universities who contested the legality
of the U.S. war on Afghanistan are Marjorie Cohn, currently president
of the National Lawyers Guild, Michael Ratner, now president of
the Center for Constitutional Rights, Francis Boyle, Brian Foley,
Jordan Paust, and John Quigley.
"Gallup International poll on terrorism in the U.S. (figures),"
Gallup International, late September, 2001. Also see Abid Aslam,
"Polls Question Global Support for Military Campaign," Inter-Press
Service, October 8, 2001; and David Miller, "World Opinion Opposed
the Attack on Afghanistan," Sterling Media Research Center, Scotland,
November 21, 2001 (as posted to the Religion-online website).
Miller noted that "When polling companies do ask about alternatives
[to the war-option], support for war falls away." Hence, he added,
this was the reason why so much news media coverage systematically
distorts the facts away from informing people about real alternatives
and the real impact of the war on Afghanistan. In Pakistan, a
case with great resonance today, a Gallup International poll sponsored
by Newsweek in the early days after the start of the U.S. war
found that "Eighty-three percent of Pakistanis surveyed say they
side with the Taliban, with a mere 3 percent expressing support
for the United States." ("Shifting Sympathies," Newsweek Web Exclusive,
October 18, 2001.)
we are content to cite two definitions of terrorism. (1) "[V]violent
acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the
criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would
be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of
the United States or of any State;" and that "appear to be intended
- (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence
the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii)
to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination,
or kidnapping..." (United States Code, Title 18, Part I, Ch. 113B,
Section 2331, 1984.) And (2) "Any action
that is intended
to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants,
when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to
intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international
organization to do or to abstain from doing any act." (A more
secure world: Our shared responsibility. Report of the Secretary-General's
High-level Panel on Threats (New York: United Nations, 2004),
Eban, "Morality and Warfare," Jerusalem Post, August 16, 1981.
 In Matt
Rees, "Streets Red With Blood," Time Magazine, March 10, 2002.
e.g., Edward S. Herman, The Real Terror Network: Terrorism in
Fact and Propaganda (South End Press, 1982), esp. Ch. 2, "The
Semantics and Role of Terrorism," pp. 21-45; and with Gerry O'Sullivan,
The "Terrorism" Industry: The Experts and Institutions That Shape
Our View of Terror (Pantheon Books, 1989), esp. Ch. 3, "The Western
Model and Semantics of Terrorism," pp. 37-51.
Alfredo González and Horacio Cid de la Paz, Testimony on
Secret Detention Camps in Argentina (Amnesty International, 1980).
Donnelly et al., Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategy, Forces,
and Resources for a New Century, Project for the New American
Century, September, 2000, p. 51, col. 1. Also see n. 2, above.
last major "terrorism" report by the U.S. Department of State
prior to 9/11 was Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000 (April 30,
2001). Within its Appendix B, "Background Information on Terrorist
Groups," the entry for "al-Qaida" stated that the group "May have
several hundred to several thousand members," adding that "Bin
is said to have inherited approximately $300 million
that he uses to finance the group." In the Congressional Research
Services' last major assessment of "Near Eastern Terrorism" published
the day before 9/11, the CRS reported that "Bin Ladin is estimated
to have about $300 million in personal financial assets with which
he funds his network of as many as 3,000 Islamic militants." (Kenneth
Katzman, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2001,
Congressional Research Service, September 10, 2001, p. 13.)
to conservative estimates on global military trends in the annual
Yearbook published by the Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute, whereas the last Clinton budget for fiscal year 2001
devoted $345 billion to military account, by fiscal year 2006,
Bush's fifth, this had increased to at least $529 billion (i.e.,
both in constant 1985 dollars). The SIPRI Yearbook 2007 reports
that "U.S. outlays... increased by 53 percent... between 2001
and 2006, primarily as a result of allocations of $381 billion
for military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere."
World military expenditure in 2001 was $839 billion, but by 2006
was "estimated to have reached $1204 billion in current U.S. dollars,"
an increase of "37 percent between 1997 and 2006." The primary
driver of these huge increases: The mythical Global War on Terror
which, in reality, has witnessed the most aggressive U.S. and
allied military expansion in history. (See SIPRI Yearbook 2002
Summary, pp. 12-13; and SIPRI Yearbook 2007 Summary, pp. 12-13.)
e.g., Larry Birns and Michael Lettieri, "Washington May Soon Try
to Pin the Venezuelan Uranium Tail on the Iranian Nuclear Donkey,"
Council on Hemispheric Affairs, May 9, 2006; and Larry Birns and
Tiffany Isaacs, "Chávez Could Fuel U.S. Propaganda Campaign
with Upcoming Bilateral talks with Kim Jong Il, If Misguided Strategy
Is Adopted," Council on Hemispheric Affairs, July 16, 2006.
Chalmers Johnson, "Abolish the CIA!," TomDispatch, November 5,
2004. Also see Johnson's Blowback: The Costs and Consequences
of American Empire, 2nd. Ed. (Metropolitan Books, 2004).
A government that needs U.S. business," Business Week, November
Ignatieff, "Who Are Americans to Think That Freedom Is Theirs
to Spread?" New York Times Magazine, June 26, 2005 (as posted
to the Harvard University website).
e.g., Marjorie Cohn, Cowboy Republic: Six Ways the Bush Gang Has
Defied the Law (PoliPoint Press, 2007).
Priest, "Foreign Network at Front of CIA's Terror Fight," Washington
Post, November 18, 2005.
W. Bush, "President Delivers 'State of the Union'," White House
Office of the Press Secretary, January 28, 2003.
Floyd, "Sacred Terror," Moscow Times, December 8, 2005 (as posted
by the Information Clearing House).
Marty et al., Alleged secret detentions and unlawful inter-state
transfers of detainees involving Council of Europe member states
(Doc. 10957), Council of Europe, June 12, 2006,. Annex, "The global
'spider's web'." Also see Christos Pourgourides et al., Enforced
Disappearances (Doc. 10679), Council of Europe, September 19,
2005; and Dick Marty et al., Secret detentions and illegal transfers
of detainees involving Council of Europe member states: Second
report (AS/Jur/2007/36), Council of Europe, June 7, 2007.
Pearlstein et al., Ending Secret Detentions, Human Right First,
see Deborah Pearlstein and Priti Patel, Behind the Wire: An Update
to Ending Secret Detentions, Human Rights First, March, 2005;
and Guantanamo and beyond: The continuing pursuit of unchecked
executive power, Amnesty International, May 13, 2005.
on interviews that it conducted in late 2003 and early 2004 with
U.S. military personnel serving in Iraq, a confidential report
that the International Committee of the Red Cross used to highlight
prisoner abuses at Abu Ghraib and other prisons run by the occupying
forces is reputed to have estimated that "70 percent to 90 percent
of prisoners had been wrongly arrested" and, we might add, this
is assuming that the occupying forces had any right to arrest
anybody. See Peter Slevin, "System Failures Cited for Delayed
Action on Abuses," Washington Post, May 20, 2004; and R. Jeffrey
Smith, "Army Report Warned in November About Prison Problems,"
Washington Post, May 30, 2004.
1267 (S/RES/1267), October 15, 1999.
Goodman, "UN sanctions on Taliban to surrender Bin Laden force,"
The Independent, October 16, 1999; "Taleban slams U.N. sanctions
over Osama bin Laden," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, October 16, 1999.
Among the body of statements attributed to bin Laden over many
years are several that identify the United Nations with the United
States precisely because, in his view, various agencies of the
UN have aligned themselves with the U.S. "war on terror."
1269 (S/RES/1269), October 19, 1999. Barbara Crossette, "U.N.
Council in Rare Accord: Fight Terrorism," New York Times, October
1373 (S/RES/1373), September 28, 2001; Resolution 1540 (S/RES/1540),
April 28, 2004.
Mueller and Karl Mueller, "Sanctions of Mass Destruction," Foreign
Affairs, May/June, 1999.These authors noted that economic
sanctions (i.e., warfare) have been "deployed frequently, by large
states rather than small ones, and may have contributed to more
deaths during the post-Cold War era than all weapons of mass destruction
throughout history... The destructive potential of economic sanctions
can be seen most clearly, albeit in an extreme form, in Iraq...
No one knows with any precision how many Iraqi civilians have
died as a result, but various agencies of the United Nations,
which oversees the sanctions, have estimated that they have contributed
to hundreds of thousands of deaths... If the U.N. estimates of
the human damage in Iraq are even roughly correct... it would
appear that... economic sanctions may well have been a necessary
cause of the deaths of more people in Iraq than have been slain
by all so-called weapons of mass destruction throughout history."
Annan, In larger freedom: towards development, security and human
rights for all (A/59/2005), United Nations, March 21, 2005, par.
 In the
case of Operation Allied Force, the U.S.-led NATO bloc's 1999
aggression against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Kofi Annan
had quietly advocated on behalf of war for as many as nine months
in advance of it.See, e.g., Kofi Annan, "Secretary-General
Reflects on Intervention" (SG/SM/6613), Ditchley Foundation Lecture,
United Kingdom, June 26, 1998; and Kofi Annan, "Secretary-General
Calls for Unconditional Respect for Human Rights of Kosovo Citizens"
(SG/SM/6878), NATO Headquarters, Belgium, January 28, 1999. As
Annan delivered these lectures in the context of NATO's threats
of war, we hardly believe that they can be taken as calls for
NATO to stand down.
 In the
Legality of Use of Force cases (1999 - 2004), brought by the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia against ten of the members of NATO that
attacked it in 1999, the International Court of Justice ruled
that as the defendant-powers refused to recognize the ICJ's jurisdiction
in the cases brought before it by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
the ICJ "manifestly lacks jurisdiction to entertain Yugoslavia's
Application" and "cannot therefore indicate any provisional measure
whatsoever" that is, lacking jurisdiction, it cannot issue an
injunction or rule on the legality of NATO's use of force. (See,
e.g., Yugoslavia v. United States of America, June 2, 1999. Each
of the other nine cases wound up the same.)
9/11 Commission Report, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
Upon the United States, July 22, 2004, esp. Ch. 12, "What To Do?
A Global Strategy," and Ch. 13, " How To Do It? A Different Way
of Organizing the Government." As recently as the first week of
January 2008, former Commission co-chairs Thomas H. Kean and Lee
H. Hamilton complained about the CIA's withholding of evidence
and obstruction of the Commission's inquiry. See "Stonewalled
by the C.I.A.," New York Times, January 2, 2008.
Note: The above article was posted on Information Clearing